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Clicks, Bricks, and Politics:
Website Accessibility Under Title II
and Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Elliza Guta*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s role in modern society is constantly expanding. While
only a few thousand websites were in existence in the early 1990s, there
are almost two billion active websites today.1 Every major business,
news source, health care provider, and government entity has an online
presence and the nation’s reliance on the Internet is growing. The role
of the Internet in Americans’ daily lives is not a new phenomenon, but
in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of the Internet and
online technology has dramatically increased. Whether it’s grocery
shopping, zoom-school, or checking local infection rates, the pandemic
has only further cemented the role of websites and online media
platforms in our lives.2
Despite the increasing importance of the Internet, many websites
remain inaccessible to over sixty million disabled individuals living in
America today.3 While the advent of new assistive technologies makes it
*First, I would like to thank Professor Steve Johnson for his advice and guidance during
the writing and editing process. This article would not have been possible without his
mentorship. Second, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and
encouragement throughout my legal education. Lastly, I want to thank God for the many
blessings He has given me—the opportunity to go to law school, to have my work
published, and to amplify the voices of the disabled community. To Him be the glory.
1. Total
Number
of
Websites,
INTERNET
LIVE
STATS,
https://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
2. See Randy Pavlicko, The Future of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Website
Accessibility Litigation After Covid-19, 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 953, 954 (2021).
3. One in four individuals in America has a disability. Disability Impacts All of Us,
CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-
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possible for disabled individuals to access the Internet and use
computers in ways that were previously impossible, the “digital divide”
persists as businesses continually fail to create and modify websites to
work with assistive technologies.4 The large-scale transition from
brick-and-mortar services to “click-and-mortar” services illustrates that
the problem of website accessibility is not disappearing anytime soon.5
In response to this growing problem, the disabled community has filed
countless lawsuits against both government and private entities under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).6
Although the ADA was created to remedy the pervasive problem of
discrimination against disabled individuals, the ADA’s application to
websites remains unclear. The majority of website accessibility claims
have been filed against private entities under Title III of the ADA.7 For
over twenty years, courts have debated whether websites are places of
public accommodation subject to Title III’s accessibility requirements.8
Recently, there has been an influx of claims brought against public

all.html#:~:text=61%20million%20adults%20in%20the,is%20highest%20in%20the%20Sou
th (last visited Jan. 5, 2022). After surveying the top one million websites, WebAIM, a
non-profit website accessibility evaluator, concluded that 97.4% of websites remain
inaccessible to individuals with disabilities. The WebAIM Million: An Annual Accessibility
Analysis of the Top 1,000,000 Home Pages, WEBAIM, https://webaim.org/projects/million/
(last visited Jan. 5, 2022). Of the seventy-two most frequently used government websites,
30% had inaccessible homepages. Natalie Alms, Many Federal Website Don’t Meet
Accessibility Requirements, Study Finds, THE BUSINESS OF FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY (Jun. 6,
2021),
https://fcw.com/articles/2021/06/06/federal-websites-accessibilitystudy.aspx?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132720989&_hsenc=p2ANqtz9uTYbgrELPJaN0dSNvmRg6IvGV1YFccfWktEsk9MdcY6u3R27xM7Q2JFTgAlpBs6SKUj
o9mzQIuGEPQKkkgA7SR7rtQQ&utm_content=132720989&utm_source=hs_email.
4. Arjeta Albani, Equality in the Age of the Internet: Websites Under Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 97 (2017).
5. Alexandra
Twin,
Click
and
Mortar,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/click_and_mortar.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2022);
See also Christopher Mullen, Places of Public Accommodation: Americans with
Disabilities and the Battle for Internet Accessibility, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 745 (2019).
6. See, e.g., Ernesto Claeyssen, Buy It on the ‘Gram: The Need to Extend the
Americans with Disabilities Act to the E-Commerce World, 72 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1517,
1523 (2021); Ashley Cheff, The Website Accommodations Test: Applying the Americans
with Disabilities Act to Websites, 26 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 261
(2020).
7. In 2018, over 10,000 claims of website inaccessibility under Title III of the ADA
were filed. Minh Vu et al., Website Accessibility Cases Push ADA Lawsuits to New High,
TLNT (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.tlnt.com/website-accessibility-cases-push-ada-lawsuitsto-new-high/.
8. See Nancy J. King, Website Access for Customers with Disabilities: Can We Get
There from Here?, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003).
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entities under Title II.9 While the courts are divided on the application
of Title III to claims against private entities,10 courts largely agree Title
II applies to the websites of public entities.11 Nevertheless, courts
continually struggle with the appropriate standards to determine
whether a government entity’s website is accessible.12 The lack of clear
and consistent standards illustrates that the solution to the problem of
website inaccessibility is not further judicial intervention. Instead, the
best way to address the digital divide is to amend the text of the statute
and promulgate regulations to provide comprehensive standards
applicable specifically to website accessibility claims.
This Comment analyzes website accessibility claims under both
Titles II and III of the ADA. Part two of this Comment outlines key
terms in website accessibility caselaw to familiarize readers with the
technological barriers faced by disabled individuals and current
attempts by non-profit organizations to create comprehensive standards
that remedy these barriers. Part three of this Comment provides an
overview of the history and purpose of the ADA, with an emphasis on
the two emerging perspectives on how the text should be interpreted.
Part four delves into the application of the ADA to website accessibility
claims. Part five provides an overview of Title II caselaw and part six
gives an in-depth analysis of the circuit split in Title III caselaw. Part
seven discusses the implications of website accessibility caselaw on
businesses and individuals with disabilities, highlighting the
insufficiencies of the current piecemeal litigation approach to securing
rights. Lastly, part eight evaluates three potential remedies to the
problem of website inaccessibility: (1) continued judicial interpretation,
(2) promulgating regulations, and (3) amending the text of the statute.
II. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
A. Defining Website Accessibility
The World Wide Web Consortium13 defines “website accessibility” as
the ability to perceive, understand, navigate, interact, and contribute to

9. Elizabeth Bowersox, Municipalities and Universities New Targets in ADA Website
Accessibility
Lawsuits,
JDSUPRA
(Mar.
1,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/municipalities-and-universities-new-65775/.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. The World Wide Web Consortium (WSC) is an international non-profit
organization that creates standards to foster website accessibility. About W3C, W3C WEB
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the web.14 In the context of anti-discrimination litigation, the term
“website accessibility” describes a broad-based movement to remove
intangible barriers to online platforms, so individuals with disabilities
can access the online content available to non-disabled individuals.15
Common examples of these barriers include: lack of closed captioning on
videos and audio content, insufficient color contrasting, and the
inability to magnify text.16 For example, an individual who is legally
blind or has low vision may rely on screen readers to access online
content. Screen readers are software programs that translate online
text into audio content or braille to help visually impaired individuals
“read” the online text and navigate the webpage.17 Websites that lack
headings, contain links with vague descriptors, such as “click here,” or
lack alternative text to describe images displayed on the page, make it
increasingly difficult for individuals to navigate the webpage using
screen reader software.18 The website accessibility movement focuses on
removing these barriers. Most website accessibility claims address
accessibility issues faced by individuals with vision-, hearing-, and
mobility-impairments.19
B. Applicable Standards
The ADA is silent on the appropriate standards web developers
should follow when creating online content. The ADA does not mention

ACCESSIBILITY INITIATIVE (WAI), https://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Jan. 5,
2022).
14. Introduction
to
Web
Accessibility,
W3C
WAI,
https://www.w3.org/WAI/fundamentals/accessibility-intro/#what (last visited Jan. 5,
2022).
15. Jessica Navarro, The 10 Most Common Accessibility Issues, SITEIMPROVE (Jul. 6,
2021), https://siteimprove.com/en-us/blog/common-accessibility-issues/.
16. Id.; The Most Common Web Accessibility Issues to Avoid, BUREAU OF INTERNET
ACCESSIBILITY (Nov. 3, 2017).
https://www.boia.org/blog/the-most-common-web-accessibility-issues-to-avoid.
17. Screen
Readers,
AMERICAN
FOUNDATION
FOR
THE
BLIND,
https://www.afb.org/blindness-and-low-vision/using-technology/assistive-technologyproducts/screen-readers (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
18. Make
Your
Webpages
Accessible,
AMHERST
COLLEGE,
https://www.amherst.edu/help/web-tips/make_accessible (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
19. See Gavin Appleby et. al., The Wave of Website and Other ADA Accessibility
Claims–What
You
Should
Know,
INSIGHT
(Feb.
22,
2016),
https://www.littler.com/files/2016_2_the_wave_of_website_and_other_ada_accessibility_cl
aims.pdf; See also Ryan C. Brunner, Websites As Facilities Under ADA Title III, DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 171, 191 n.170 (2017); Laura Wolk, Equal Access in Cyberspace: On
Bridging the Digital Divide in Public Accommodations Coverage Through Amendment to
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 475 (2015).
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the Internet or websites. And the Department of Justice
(Department)—the agency responsible for promulgating regulations
under Titles II and III of the ADA—has also not published regulations
on website accessibility.20 However, the Department has informally
endorsed, and courts have occasionally adopted the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) as the appropriate standard for
website accessibility.21 The WCAG are guidelines developed by the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), to help web developers,
businesses, and public entities create websites that are easily navigable
for individuals with disabilities.22 Although no standard can perfectly
outline the necessary components of website accessibility,23 the WCAG
standards are detailed, comprehensive, and generally regarded as the
gold standard for assessing whether a website provides equal access to
individuals with disabilities.24 Nevertheless, while some courts have
referred to the standards as a potential equitable remedy for violations
of the ADA’s accessibility requirements, not all courts have endorsed
WCAG’s adoption.25 As a result, there are currently no nationwide
standards for businesses and public entities to reference with
confidence that conformity to those standards will ensure compliance
with the law.
III. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA
The ADA is a sweeping statute, enacted to remedy the widespread
discrimination faced by disabled Americans.26 A uniquely bipartisan
bill, the ADA passed the House and the Senate by a wide margin.27
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2021).
21. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. 1, 196 (2010).
22. The first set of guidelines, WCAG 2.0, were published in December 2008. WCAG
2.0 was superseded by WCAG 2.1 in June 2018 and W3C has announced plans to publish
updated guidelines in 2022. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, W3C
WAI, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/wcag/#versions (last visited Jan. 5,
2022).
23. Some disability advocates argue that website accessibility standards will always
be incomplete due to the fast-paced, every-changing nature of the Internet. Jonathan
Hassell, The Future of WCAG – Maximising Its Strengths Not Its Weaknesses, HASSELL
INCLUSION (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.hassellinclusion.com/blog/wcag-future.
24. See, e.g., Brunner, supra note 19, at 192; Mullen, supra note 5, at 767.
25. Compare Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 907 (9th Cir. 2019), with
Carroll v. FedFinancial Fed. Credit Union, 324 F. Supp. 3d 658, 667 (E.D. Va. 2018).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2008); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674
(2001).
27. The House approved the bill with a vote of 377 to 28 and the Senate passed it by a
margin of 91 to 6. Righting the Americans with Disabilities Act, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY (Dec. 1, 2004), https://ncd.gov/publications/2004/dec12004.
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When signing the Act, President George H.W. Bush referred to it as the
“first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities,”
and “a powerful expansion of protections,” and “basic civil rights.”28
With these purposes in mind, Congress addressed three primary areas
of discrimination, each reflected in a separate chapter of the ADA: Title
I prohibits discrimination in private employment; Title II prohibits
discrimination by public entities (i.e., state and local governments); and
Title III prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation (i.e.,
private businesses that offer commercial services to the public).29 Each
chapter begins with a general anti-discrimination provision,30 and then
lays out separate prohibitions against discrimination in a host of more
targeted areas including physical access, eligibility requirements, and
participation in activities.31
The ADA’s main strengths are its “comprehensive character,”32 and
its “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards.”33 While these
characteristics are often complementary, courts reach opposite
conclusions regarding the application of the ADA to websites depending
on whether they prioritize the law’s comprehensive character or its
clear, consistent standards.
On the one hand, the statute includes broad language and catch-all
provisions to eliminate discrimination in a wide range of activities—
illustrating the ADA’s comprehensive character.34 Recognizing that
Congress could not foresee every form and manifestation of
discrimination, the statute was written to adapt to changing
circumstances. As one Congressman put it, “the Committee intends that
the types of accommodation and services provided to individuals with
disabilities, under all of the titles of [the ADA], should keep pace with
the rapidly changing technology of the times.”35 The comprehensive

28. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1068 (Jul. 26, 1990).
29. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12132, 12182(b) (2008).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)–12117(b), 12133–12165, 12182–12189 (2008).
32. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 before the S.
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong. 197 (1989) (statement of Attorney General Dick Thornburgh).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2008).
34. For example, the inclusion of the phrase “or other establishment” after each
example of places of public accommodation is argued by some as evidence that Congress
intended for the statute to expand beyond the listed examples. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
(2008); see also Albani, supra note 4, at 101.
35. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 391.
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nature of the statute suggests that evolving technologies, such as
websites, should be included within the statute’s mandate.36
On the other hand, the statute provides great detail on the specific
entities covered, the actions necessary to satisfy the anti-discrimination
provisions, and the consequences for non-compliance—illustrating the
ADA’s emphasis on specific standards.37 As one court put it, “[w]here
Congress has created specifically enumerated rights and expressed the
intent of setting forth ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,’
courts must follow the law as written and wait for Congress to adopt or
revise legislatively-defined standards that apply to those rights.”38
Consequently, the Act’s detail and specificity suggest that the disparity
between the Act’s lack of website accessibility standards and the Act’s
purpose of eliminating discrimination should be remedied by Congress
and not the judiciary.39 Arguments over whether courts should
interpret the broad language of the ADA to include standards governing
website accessibility or wait for Congress to amend the statute
dominate discussions of website accessibility claims.40
IV. DETANGLING THE WEB: THE APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO WEBSITES
Judicial interpretations of Title II and III of the ADA differ
dramatically in their application to website accessibility claims,
notwithstanding the striking similarities in the statutory and
regulatory language.41 Title II, which applies to state and local
governments, provides that individuals with disabilities shall not “be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities of a public entity.”42 Similarly, Title III, which
applies to private businesses that offer services to the public, states
that individuals with disabilities shall not “be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
36. See Albani, supra note 4, at 101–02.
37. For example, the inclusion of separate and specific standards in the provisions on
places of public accommodation is argued by some as evidence of Congressional intent to
limit covered activity to the entities and activities described on the face of the statute.
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also Wolk, supra note 19, at 471.
38. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)).
39. Wolk, supra note 19, at 472.
40. Claeyssen, supra note 6, at 1534; Wolk, supra note 19, at 472.
41. Compare Meyer v. Walthall, 528 F. Supp. 3d 928, 958–59 (S.D. Ind. 2021), with
Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1274–77 (11th Cir. 2021), opinion vacated
on reh’g, 17-13467-CC, 2021 WL 6129128 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2021).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2008).
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place of public accommodation.”43 The statutory language of both titles
prohibits discrimination in a host of public and private activities and
services. Additionally, the regulations under Titles II and III,
promulgated under the Department’s rulemaking authority,44 require
public entities and places of public accommodation to provide “auxiliary
aids” to ensure that communication with disabled individuals is as
“effective” as communication with nondisabled individuals.45 Under
both titles, auxiliary aids include “accessible electronic and information
technology,” such as “screen reader software,” and “closed caption
decoders.”46
Despite the similarities in the statutory and regulatory language,
courts have reached contrasting conclusions on the application of the
ADA to website accessibility claims based on whether the claim is
brought under Title II or III. Courts interpreting the “services” of a
public entity under Title II recognize that websites fall within this
broad statutory language.47 Thus, public entities are required to provide
auxiliary aids—such as programming compatible with screen reader
software or closed captioning on videos—to ensure that the public
entity’s service is accessible to individuals with disabilities.48 Courts
interpreting the “services” of a place of public accommodation under
Title III, however, are divided on whether Congress intended to include
websites and thus whether the auxiliary aid regulations mandate the
operation of accessible websites.49 Consequently, the key difference
between the two provisions, resulting in differing outcomes in website
accessibility claims, is the interpretation of the term “services” as
applied to public and private entities.

43. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2008).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2008); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998)
(holding that DOJ’s administrative guidance on ADA compliance is entitled to deference).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has rule-making authority under Title I
of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2008).
45. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2010) (“A public entity shall furnish appropriate
auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford qualified individuals with
disabilities . . . an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service,
program, or activity of a public entity.”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(1) (2010) (“A public
accommodation shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to
ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.”).
46. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2010); Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b) (2010).
47. E.g., Meyer, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 958–59.
48. Id. at 959.
49. E.g., Gil, 993 F.3d at 1277; See, e.g., Robles, 913 F.3d at 904.
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V. TITLE II
Courts have consistently applied Title II to websites operated by
public entities based on a uniform interpretation of the phrase
“services, programs, or activities.”50 Multiple circuit courts—namely,
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—have expressly
held the plain language of the statute, in conjunction with the ADA’s
expansive purpose, supports a broad application of the Title II
accessibility requirements.51 The Second Circuit, for instance,
characterized the phrase “services, programs, or activities” as a
“catch-all” provision that should be interpreted broadly to avoid
“hair-splitting arguments” by public entities attempting to avoid the
requirements of Title II.52
The broad scope of “services, programs, or activities” in Title II’s
prohibition against discrimination indicates that websites are naturally
included within Title II’s mandate. The Department has long
interpreted “services, programs, or activities” to cover websites operated
by state and local governments, even though the ADA does not
explicitly reference the Internet.53 The Department emphasized that
public entities choosing to provide services online or communicate
information through the Internet “must ensure that individuals with
disabilities have equal access to such services or information.”54
Moreover, almost every federal court addressing this issue concluded
that government websites related to public programs are covered under

50. See e.g., Meyer, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 959; Martin v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Reininger v. Oklahoma,
292 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1264–64 (W.D. Okla. 2017); Innes v. Board of Regents of University
System of Maryland, 29 F. Supp. 3d 566, 580–81 (D. Md. 2014); Eason v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Elections, No. 16-cv-4292 (KBF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209249, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
20, 2017); Hindel v. Husted, No. 2:15-cv-3061, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13820, at *13 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 1, 2017); Payan v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., Nos. 19-56111, 19-56146, 2021 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25324 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2021).
51. See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44–47
(2d Cir. 1997); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569–70 (6th Cir. 1998); Ashby v.
Warrick Cnty. Sch. Corp., 908 F.3d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 2018); Bahl v. Cty. of Ramsey, 695
F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2012); Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076–77 (9th Cir.
2002).
52. Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 45; see also Johnson, 151 F.3d at 570 (“[T]he word
‘activities,’ on its face, suggests great breadth and offers little basis to exclude any actions
of a public entity.”).
53. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, 1, 178 (2021).
54. Id.; see also Accessibility of State and Local Government Websites to People with
Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2003), https://www.ada.gov/websites2.htm.
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Title II.55 For example, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, in Meyer v. Walthall,56 explained that
“[t]here is no articulable reason why” state government websites “that
provide information about and applications for vital government
benefits programs . . . would fall outside the broad category of
government activities encompassed by ‘services, programs, or
activities.’”57
While courts agree that Title II applies to websites operated by
public entities, courts have struggled to determine whether a website
complies with Title II’s accessibility requirements.58 For example, in
Meyer, the court was unable to determine at the summary judgment
phase whether the defendant’s website was accessible.59 The plaintiffs
argued that the defendants’ website, which was incompatible with
screen reading software, violated Title II because it did not comply with
WCAG standards.60 The district court agreed that Title II applied to the
defendants’ website and that the inability to use screen reader software
meant that the website was inaccessible.61 However, the court went on
to state that while “primary consideration must be given to the
plaintiff’s requested accommodation,” (i.e., the WCAG standards), the
accommodation “need not be perfect or the one most strongly preferred,
by the plaintiff” to comply with Title II.62 Because there are multiple
methods to ensure website accessibility, the court held that the
defendants’ refusal to conform its website to WCAG did not mean that

55. Eason, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209249, at *4–5 (state election website); Hindel,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13820, at *13 (state election website); Martin, 225 F. Supp. 2d at
1377 (state transportation website); Meyer, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 959 (state family and social
services website); Payan, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25324, at *11 (community college
website); Reininger, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 1264 (state legislature website). Specifically, every
federal court except a district court in Florida has concluded that a website is a service,
program, or activity. Gil v. Broward Cty., Fla., No. 18-60282-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225828, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2018). Citing to Title III caselaw, the
court in Gil, dismissed the plaintiff’s Title II claim for failure to allege a nexus to a
physical space. Id. A later district court case criticized Gil for incorrectly “lumping
together all ADA cases involving alleged website violations” and applying Title III
caselaw to a Title II claim. Price v. City of Ocala, Florida, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1272
(M.D. Fla. 2019).
56. 528 F. Supp. 3d 928 (S.D. Ind. 2021).
57. Id. at 958–59.
58. E.g., id. at 961–62; Payan, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25324, at *11–12.
59. 528 F. Supp. 3d at 959.
60. Id. at 961.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 960.
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the defendants violated Title II, and denied summary judgment for both
parties.63
Without clear statutory or regulatory guidance, the conclusion that
accessibility can be achieved in multiple ways has resulted in
inconsistent application of the WCAG standards. Some courts use
WCAG as the benchmark for liability, while others insist that WCAG is
not applicable because it has not been formally adopted by the
Department.64 The lack of clarity on the appropriate benchmark for
accessibility means that these claims are often litigated and taken to
trial, an expensive and time-consuming process.65 This case-by-case
analysis conflicts with the uniformity and consistency outlined in the
ADA’s purpose statement.66
Judicial confusion on the standards to adjudicate website
accessibility claims under Title II illustrates that a key issue in the
website accessibility caselaw is not only whether the ADA applies to
websites, but also, what standards should be used to assess
accessibility.
VI. TITLE III: THE “PLACE” WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG
Courts have inconsistently applied Title III to websites operated by
places of public accommodation. Two circuit splits have emerged as a
result. Originally, circuits were divided as to whether Title III is limited
to physical spaces. The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits all
concluded that places of public accommodation are not limited to
physical spaces.67 Under this interpretation, a website is a place of
public accommodation and any services offered on the website are
subject to Title III’s accessibility requirements.68 The Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, however, concluded that places of public
accommodation are limited to actual, physical spaces.69 To challenge the
63. Id. at 962.
64. Compare Hindel, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13820, at *12–13, with Meyer, 528 F.
Supp. 3d at 962.
65. See, e.g., Payan, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25324, at *12.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
67. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994); Markett v. Five Guys Enters. LLC, No. 17-cv-788 (KBF), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115212, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2017); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.,
179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).
68. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201–02 (D. Mass.
2012).
69. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000);
Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (6th Cir. 1997); Gil, 993 F.3d at
1277.
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accessibility of a website, plaintiffs would need to allege a “connection”
between the website and a physical store.70
Among the courts requiring a connection to a physical location, a new
circuit split is emerging—whether the services of a place of public
accommodation incorporates websites or is limited to the services
offered at physical brick-and-mortar stores. Using the “nexus” standard,
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that websites can be a
service of a place of public accommodation.71 However, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a narrower interpretation under its “intangible barrier”
standard.72 Because public accommodations are limited to physical
places, websites are subject to regulation under Title III only if they
create an intangible barrier to the accessibility of the goods and services
of the physical store.73 Thus, a new division among courts has arisen:
whether Title III is limited to the tangible goods and services available
at the physical location of the place of public accommodation or whether
Title III encompasses intangible services such as websites.74
A. Physical Places vs. Digital Spaces: The argument that public
accommodations are not limited to physical places.
The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have all held that places of
public accommodation are not limited to actual, physical places.75 The
initial cases analyzing whether Title III is limited to physical spaces
occurred in the context of insurance policies.76 Focusing on the broad
purposes of the statute and legislative history, these circuits concluded
that insurance contracts could be subject to Title III’s
anti-discrimination provisions because Title III was not limited to
physical structures.77 These opinions laid the foundation for future
courts to extend the protections of Title III to web-only businesses.78
Because websites are places of public accommodation, any of the

70. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
71. Id.; Robles, 913 F.3d at 905.
72. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1278.
73. Id.
74. E.g., Gil, 993 F.3d at 1280–81, 1293–95 (compare majority and dissent analysis of
a place of public accommodation’s goods and services).
75. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Markett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115212, at *4–5; Doe,
179 F.3d at 559.
76. Wolk, supra note 19, at 450.
77. Josephine Meyer, Accessible Websites and Mobile Applications Under the ADA:
The Lack of Legal Guidelines and What This Means for Businesses and Their Customers,
44 SEATTLE U.L. REV. SUPRA 14, 16, 18–19 (2020).
78. Cheff, supra note 6, at 266–67.
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amenities offered by a businesses on its website is a service of a place of
public accommodation.
The First Circuit was the first to address whether places of public
accommodation are limited to physical structures.79 In Carparts
Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesaler Association of New
England,80 the First Circuit held that an insurance policy could be
subject to Title III’s anti-discrimination provisions because places of
public accommodation were not limited to physical structures.81 The
court highlighted the list of public accommodations in the definitional
section of the ADA, which included “a ‘travel service,’ a ‘shoe repair
service,’ an ‘office of an accountant, or lawyer,’ an ‘insurance office,’ a
‘professional office of a healthcare provider,’ and ‘other service
establishment[s].’”82 Reasoning that many of these service
establishments conduct their business without a physical location, the
court stated that “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail
are not.”83 Notably, the court cited to the lack of Department
regulations mentioning “physical boundaries or physical entry” as
further support for the conclusion that Title III was not limited to
physical spaces.84 By focusing on the broad, remedial purpose of the
ADA, applicable legislative history, and the “illustrative” list of example
public accommodations, the court concluded that Title III was not
limited to physical structures.85
District courts in the First Circuit have extended Carparts to mean
that web-only businesses are places of public accommodation under
Title III.86 In National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix,87 the United
79. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
80. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2008)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 20. Interestingly, the Department has issued regulatory guidance
referencing physical structures in its definition of place of public accommodation.
Specifically, the Department defines a place of public accommodation as “a facility
operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one
of the following categories.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2010). Facility is further defined as “all or
any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other
conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property,
including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.” Id.
This definition exclusively references physical structures.
85. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19–20.
86. E.g., Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200–202; Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC,
No. 17-CV-116-JL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185112, at *9–10 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017).
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States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the
web-only streaming service, Netflix, was a place of public
accommodation.88 The court provided three reasons for its conclusion.89
First, legislative history indicated that Congress intended the statute to
evolve with changing technology.90 Second, legislative history indicated
that the examples included in the definition of public accommodations
were illustrative, not exhaustive.91 Thus, Congress’s failure to list the
Internet or websites as an example place of public accommodation was
not dispositive.92 Third, the ADA “covers the services ‘of’ a public
accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a public accommodation.”93
Consequently, although Netflix provided services for use in the home,
which is not a place of public accommodation, the website was still a
service “of” a place of public accommodation subject to Title III’s
accessibility requirements.94
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance
Company,95 held that public accommodations are not limited to physical
locations in the context of a life insurance policy dispute.96 Citing
Carparts, the court stated that Title III was “meant to guarantee [the
disabled] more than mere physical access.”97 And, just as the district
court in Netflix noted, the Second Circuit in Pallozzi highlighted that
Title III is not limited to services provided “at” or “in” a place of public
accommodation.98 Even though an insurance contract is not used on the
premises of the insurance agency, the contract was still a service of a
place of public accommodation.99
Emphasizing that Title III is not limited by physical spaces, the
Pallozzi decision, like Carparts, set the stage for future challenges to

87. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
88. Id. at 201–02.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 200–01.
91. Id. at 201.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 204 F.3d 392 (2d
Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 32–33.
97. Id. at 32.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Id.
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web-only businesses.100 The district court in Andrews v. Blick Art
Materials,101 for example, interpreted the court’s decision in Pallozzi to
mean that “the sale of goods and services to the public, rather than how
and where that sale is executed” is “crucial” when determining Title
III’s applicability.102 In other words, whether the defendant sells goods
and services through an online retail website or a physical
brick-and-mortar store, the determining factor is the sale of goods to the
public, not the physical location of that sale.103 As a result, a website
can itself be a place of public accommodation.104
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company,105 held that places of public accommodation are not limited to
physical spaces.106 Addressing yet another insurance contract claim, the
court in Doe concluded that the “core meaning” of Title III is that the
“store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web
site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space)
that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering
the facility,” or “from using the facility in the same way that the
nondisabled do.”107 Citing Doe, district courts in the Seventh Circuit
have held that the ADA applies to web-only businesses, such as Uber.108
Under the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits interpretation of the
ADA, Title III regulates websites operated by places of public
accommodation with physical locations and businesses that sell

100. See, e.g., National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 571,
575–76 (D. Vt. 2015); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 391, 398
(E.D.N.Y. 2017).
101. 268 F. Supp. 3d at 381.
102. Id. at 392.
103. Id.
104.Id. at 398; see also Dominguez v. N.Y. Equestrian Ctr., Ltd., No. 18-cv-9799
(AJN), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179258, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2020); Wu v. Jensen-Lewis
Co., 345 F. Supp. 3d 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
105. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 559.
107. Id. at 559 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19) (emphasis added). This interpretation
was reiterated in another Seventh Circuit case on insurance contracts when the court
gave the analogy that the ADA prohibits a furniture store from refusing to sell furniture
to a disabled person whether the exchange occurs in person or over the Internet. Morgan
v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan of Pillsbury Co., and Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers, 268 F.3d
456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001).
108. Access Living of Metro. Chicago v. Uber Techs., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1155–
56 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d, 958 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Wright v. Experiment, No.
1:19-cv-01423-SEB-TAB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at *11-12 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22,
2021).
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products or services exclusively online.109 Relying on the broad remedial
purpose of the statute and legislative history, these circuits have
concluded that Title III is not limited to physical locations.110 Although
the circuit courts have yet to definitively hold that websites are subject
to Title III, the opinions addressing insurance contracts have
established a broad framework for interpreting the text of the
statute.111 District courts applying this caselaw have extended the
protections of the ADA to a wide range of online business activity.112
B. Physical Places vs. Digital Spaces: The argument that public
accommodations are limited to physical places.
While the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have all held that a
connection to a physical location is not necessary to bring at Title III
claim,113 the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have arrived at the
opposite conclusion.114 Relying on canons of statutory construction and
the applicable Department regulations, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
have held the plain language of Title III requires a nexus to a physical
location.115 Courts analyzing website accessibility claims under the
nexus requirement conclude websites are one of the services offered by
brick-and-mortar places of public accommodation.116 Brick-and-mortar
places of public accommodation are required to provide auxiliary aids to
ensure that their services are accessible to individuals with disabilities;
thus, physical stores must operate accessible websites.117 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, has rejected the nexus standard and the
interpretation of services that incorporates websites.118 Rather the
intangible barrier standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit focuses on
whether the website creates an impediment to the accessibility of the
services offered at the physical store.119 The differing interpretation of
109. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Markett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115212, at *4–5; Doe,
179 F.3d at 559.
110. See supra note 75.
111. See supra Part VI, Section A.
112. See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ., 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 60–61 (D.
Mass. 2019).
113. See supra Part VI, Section A.
114. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010–11; Gil, 993 F.3d at 1277.
115. Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying
the “Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 975 (2004).
116. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
117. Robles, 913 F.3d at 904–05.
118. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1278.
119. Id.
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services under the nexus and intangible barrier standards has further
muddied the waters of what is required to allege a website accessibility
claim under Title III.
1. The Nexus Standard
While the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have declined to extend the
protections of Title III to web-only businesses, they have granted relief
when a plaintiff alleges a nexus between a brick-and-mortar store and a
website. Like the cases previously discussed, the issue of whether a
place of public accommodation must be an actual, physical location first
arose in the context of insurance policies.120 In Parker v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company,121 an individual sued their employer and the
insurance carrier for providing more comprehensive coverage of
physical disabilities than mental-health related disabilities.122 The
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the reasoning of the First Circuit in
Carparts, and asserted that the term public accommodation referred to
a physical, tangible place.123
Focusing on the plain meaning of the text, the Sixth Circuit argued
the court in Carparts gave the statute “unintended breadth” by not
applying the statutory canon noscitur a sociis.124 Under the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis, an ambiguous term is interpreted by reference to
surrounding terms.125 The Parker court concluded that the “clear
connotation” of the words listed in the definition of public
accommodation was an association to a physical place.126 Rather than
the word “travel service,” or “shoe repair service” referencing businesses
that conduct their affairs by phone or mail, the Parker court reasoned
“that Congress simply had no better term than ‘service’ to describe an
office where travel agents provide travel services and a place where
shoes are repaired.”127 A proper application of noscitur a sociis resolved
any ambiguity in the text foreclosing the need to reference legislative
history.128 As a result, the benefits plan (provided by the employer
rather than directly from the insurance company) was not subject to
Title III because the plan did not have a “nexus” or connection to

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1014.
Id. (quoting Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1014 n.10.
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policies offered by insurance companies’ physical locations.129 The court
did not conclude, however, that a plaintiff must “physically enter” a
place of public accommodation to bring a Title III claim and explicitly
left open whether a plaintiff could challenge the accessibility of a good
or service provided by a public accommodation “by some other
means.”130 District courts would later define “some other means” to
include websites.131
District courts within the Sixth Circuit have concluded websites
operated by brick-and-mortar stores are subject to Title III’s
accessibility requirements.132 After analyzing Parker and other circuit
court opinions, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio in Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores,133 concluded that the
plaintiff’s claim challenging the accessibility of Jo-Ann craft store’s
website was cognizable under Title III.134 For example, the plaintiff
alleged the inaccessible features of the website prevented her from
accessing the store locator feature, which impeded her ability to shop at
physical stores.135 Because the plaintiff alleged the website prevented
her from accessing the physical Jo-Ann craft stores, the court concluded
that a sufficient nexus existed between the physical place of public
accommodation and service (i.e., the website) provided by the public
accommodation.136 Although a website is not itself a place of public
accommodation, the court in Castillo recognized that a website is still
subject to regulation under Title III because it is one of the services
offered by a physical place of public accommodation.137
The Ninth Circuit adopted the nexus standard in Weyer v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film.138 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit cited the
principle of noscitur a sociis to justify the conclusion that places of
public accommodation are limited to physical locations.139 The court
briefly highlighted that there must be “some connection between the
good or service complained of and an actual, physical place”;140 however,
129. Id. at 1011.
130. Id. at 1011 n.3.
131. 286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 876 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
132. See id. at 881; Brintley v. Aeroquip Credit Union, 321 F. Supp. 3d 785, 792–93
(E.D. Mich. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 936 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2019).
133. Castillo, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 870.
134. Id. at 876.
135. Id. at 880–81.
136. Id. at 881.
137. Id.
138. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 1114.
140. Id.
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it was not until the court’s decision in Robles v. Domino’s Pizza,141 that
the specifics of the nexus standard were outlined.
In Robles, a blind individual argued Domino’s online website and
mobile app violated Title III because they were incompatible with
screen reading software.142 Domino’s is a place of public accommodation
because it operates physical restaurants throughout the nation.143
Therefore, Domino’s is required to “take such steps as may be necessary
to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied
services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”144 The
Department defines auxiliary aids and services to include “accessible
electronic and information technology.”145 As a result, Domino’s must
provide electronic software that makes its website and mobile app
compatible with screen reader technology as a part of its obligation to
offer auxiliary aids and services.146 The court emphasized that the
website and app are primarily used to locate nearby stores and order
pizzas for delivery or pick-up.147 Because the inaccessibility of the
website and app impeded the plaintiff’s access to physical stores, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the nexus requirement was satisfied.148
Although individuals do not primarily access the app and website on
the premises of Domino’s physical stores, the court clarified that the
statute “applies to the services of a place of public accommodation, not
services in a place of public accommodation.”149 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit requires brick-and-mortar public accommodations to
operate accessible websites that facilitate access to their physical
buildings.150
However, the holding in Robles is limited by the factual
circumstances presented in the case. The plaintiff alleged the website
facilitated access to the goods and services of the physical store and did

141. 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).
142. Id. at 902.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(b) (2008) (“The following private entities are considered
public accommodations for purposes of this title . . . a restaurant, bar, or other
establishment serving food or drink.”).
144. Robles, 913 F.3d at 905 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2008)) (emphasis
added).
145. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2) (2010)).
146. Robles, 913 F.3d at 905.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 905–06.
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not argue that the website itself was a service.151 Thus the court
expressly left open the question of whether “the ADA covers the
websites or apps of a physical place of public accommodation where
their inaccessibility does not impede access to the goods and services of
a physical location.”152
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have concluded that websites
are themselves a service of a place of public accommodation. For
example, in National Federation of the Blind v. Target,153 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held a
plaintiff successfully stated a claim under Title III by alleging that the
inaccessible features of Target.com prevented the plaintiff from
enjoying the goods and services of the physical store.154 The court
clarified that while website accessibility challenges must be connected
to a physical store, Title III protects more than physical access.155
Specifically, the court stated:
The case law does not support defendant’s attempt to draw a false dichotomy
between those services which impede physical access to a public
accommodation and those merely offered by the facility. Such an interpretation
would effectively limit the scope of Title III to the provision of ramps, elevators
and other aids that operate to remove physical barriers to entry. Although the
Ninth Circuit has determined that a place of public accommodation is a
physical space, the court finds unconvincing defendant’s attempt to bootstrap
the definition of accessibility to this determination, effectively reading out of
the ADA the broader provisions enacted by Congress.156

Websites connected to brick-and-mortar stores must comply with
Title III’s accessibility requirements as a service of a place of public
accommodation, even though the service is typically utilized outside of
the place of public accommodation.157 Thus, arguments that Title III
only prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of goods and services on
the premises of physical places of public accommodation do not comport
with the broad scope of the nexus test.158
Citing the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the Sixth and Ninth Circuit
have concluded that places of public accommodation must have a
physical location.159 While challenges to web-only businesses have failed
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 905.
Id. at 905 n.6.
452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 956.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014.
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in these circuits,160 websites with a connection or nexus to a physical
location must comply with Title III’s accessibility requirements.161
District courts within the Sixth and Ninth Circuit recognize that a
website is itself a service of a place of public accommodation.162 Thus, if
a plaintiff demonstrates that the business operating the website has
physical locations, then the website is subject to regulation as a service
of those brick-and-mortar businesses.163
2. The Intangible Barrier Standard
Not only are circuits divided on the application of Title III to
web-only businesses, but circuits that agree Title III is limited to
physical spaces disagree on how courts should analyze the connection
between the website and the brick-and-mortar location.164 The
development of the intangible barrier standard by the Eleventh Circuit
as an alternative to the nexus standard is a recent response to criticism
that the application of Title III to digital spaces gives the statute an
expansive interpretation not aligned with the text’s plain meaning.165
While the nexus standard recognizes that websites can themselves be a
service of a physical place of public accommodation,166 the intangible
barrier standard defines service narrowly to include only the amenities
offered at the physical location of the place of public accommodation.167
These differing interpretations have resulted in different outcomes
despite factually similar cases.
In Gil v. Winn-Dixie,168 the plaintiff, a blind man, challenged the
accessibility of Winn-Dixie’s website.169 Gil alleged that digital coupon
and online prescription re-fill features were incompatible with screen

160. See, e.g., Earll v. EBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015).
161. See supra Part VI, Section B.1.
162. See supra Part VI, Section B.1.
163. See, e.g., Castillo, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 876; Robles, 913 F.3d at 904–05.
164. Compare Robles, 913 F.3d at 904–06, with Gil, 993 F.3d at 1274–84.
165. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1281–82.
166. See, e.g., Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
167. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1281.
168. 993 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2021), opinion vacated on reh’g, 17-13467-CC, 2021 WL
6129128 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2021). The Eleventh Circuit recently issued an order vacating
its earlier opinion establishing the intangible barrier standard. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., No. 17-13467-CC, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 38489 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2021). While the
earlier opinion no longer holds the force of law, the Eleventh Circuit has not issued a
second opinion supplanting its prior reasoning. As a result, the court’s discussion of the
intangible barrier standard still provides insight into how a Title III website accessibility
case may be decided in the future.
169. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1270.
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reader software.170 Gil’s inability to use the website meant that he had
to rely on store employees or friends to convey his confidential medical
information to re-fill his prescriptions or help him clip coupons.171 As a
result, Gil argued he was unable to fully and equally enjoy the
“services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations,”
provided by Winn-Dixie through winndixie.com.172 Citing to the nexus
standard, the district court concluded that the website was “‘heavily
integrated’ with Winn-Dixie’s physical stores—so much so that it
‘operates as a gateway to the physical store locations.’”173 According to
the district court, the inaccessible features of the website violated Title
III.174 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed for two reasons.175
First, the Eleventh Circuit majority clarified that public
accommodations are limited to actual, physical spaces.176 After
restating the definition of public accommodation in § 12181(7), the court
concluded that the text is “unambiguous and clear.”177 Because all of the
examples listed in the statute “are tangible, physical places,” websites
are not places of public accommodation under Title III.178 The court was
unpersuaded by Gil’s reference to the statute’s legislative history or
statements by the Department that supported the inclusion of websites
within the meaning of public accommodation.179 Although the
Winn-Dixie website was not a place of public accommodation, the court
recognized that the website could still be subject to Title III’s
accessibility requirements if it created an intangible barrier to the
physical store.180
Second, the majority held that challenges to websites associated with
brick-and-mortar stores must satisfy the intangible barrier standard

170. Id. Winn-Dixie estimated that the cost of updating their website to make it
compatible with screen reading technology would be approximately $250,000. Id. at 1273
n.6. Ironically, Forbes estimates Winn-Dixie’s net worth at $9.6 Billion and the litigation
costs of a civil suit from pleading to appeal can easily exceed $200,000. Southeastern
Grocer, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/companies/southeasterngrocer/?sh=5077d515757d.
171. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1272.
172. Id. at 1271.
173. Id. at 1273 (quoting Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1349).
174. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1273.
175. Id. at 1275.
176. Id. at 1277.
177. Id. at 1276.
178. Id. at 1277. The dissent did not dispute this portion of the majority’s opinion. Id.
at 1277 n.14.
179. Id. at 1276 n.11–12.
180. Id. at 1278.
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rather than the nexus standard adopted by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits.181 The intangible barrier standard comes from a prior
Eleventh Circuit decision, Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions.182 In
Rendon, the plaintiffs, hearing- and mobility-impaired individuals, sued
the production company of “Who Wants To Be A Millionaire.”183 The
show selected contestants using an automated hotline. Individuals
would call the hotline number and answer a series of questions using
the keypad. The plaintiffs argued the system discriminated against the
disabled because individuals with hearing-impairments could not hear
the questions and individuals with mobility-impairments could not
answer the questions quickly enough using the keypad. As a result,
these individuals would not be selected to participate on the show.184
The defendant contended the hotline could not “serve as the basis for a
Title III claim because it is not itself a public accommodation or a
physical barrier to entry erected at a public accommodation.”185 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded the hotline was subject to Title III because
the statute covers both “tangible barriers,” such as “physical and
architectural barriers,”186 and “intangible barriers, such as eligibility
requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and
procedures that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the
defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.”187
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Rendon standard in Gil and
concluded that the website did not create an intangible barrier to Gil’s
ability to access and enjoy the goods and services of Winn-Dixie’s
physical stores.188 The court distinguished the intangible barrier
present in Rendon from the Winn-Dixie website, arguing that the phone
system in Rendon was the “sole access point” to the physical game
show.189 Gil, however, was not prevented from accessing the
prescription counter or coupon books at the physical stores.190 As a
result, the website did not prevent Gil from shopping at the physical
store and no intangible barrier was present.191

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1281.
294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1280–81.
Id. at 1283.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)).
Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii)).
Gil, 993 F.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
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The majority’s conclusion that Gil was not denied equal access to the
goods and services offered at the Winn-Dixie store highlights the key
difference between the nexus and intangible barrier standard—the
interpretation of service. Under the nexus standard, a website is a
service of a physical place of public accommodation.192 Thus, the online
prescription refill and coupon selection features located on Winn-Dixie’s
website must be accessible because they are part of the range of
services Winn-Dixie offers that just happen to be online. Under the
intangible barrier standard, however, a website is not a service of a
physical place of public accommodation.193 The majority asserted the
only services at issue were the prescription re-fill and coupon selection
services available at the physical Winn-Dixie stores.194 Because Gil had
access to those services in the store, making the online version of those
services compatible with screen reader technology was not necessary.195
Despite the similarities between the alleged accessibility issues in
Robles and Gil, the courts reached different conclusions. Both the
plaintiffs in Gil and Robles challenged website features that facilitated
access to goods and services in the store. The plaintiff in Robles wanted
to access the Domino’s pizza website and app to order food and
beverages, a service available at the physical Domino’s restaurant;196
the plaintiff in Gil wanted access to Winn-Dixie’s website to clip
coupons and pick up prescriptions, services available at the physical
Winn-Dixie stores.197 While the Ninth Circuit in Robles allowed the
plaintiff’s claim to proceed based on the nexus standard,198 the majority
in Gil held that the plaintiff’s claim failed to satisfy the connection
requirement through the intangible barrier standard.199 These different
outcomes exemplify a major problem within the Title III caselaw:
inconsistent application of Title III’s anti-discrimination provisions.

192. Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
193. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1281.
194. Id. at 1279.
195. Id. at 1280–81. The dissent contested this conclusion arguing that even if the
website itself was not a service, the in-store prescription re-fill and coupon services were
inferior for disabled customers because they lacked the convenience and privacy available
to website users. Thus, the dissent concluded that even if the statutory text was only
limited to services provided on-site at the physical store location, Gil was not able to enjoy
fully and equally those services. Id. at 1295–96 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
196. Robles, 913 F.3d at 905.
197. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1280–81.
198. Robles, 913 F.3d at 904–05.
199. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1283–84.
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VII. THE PROBLEM
Courts have wrestled with the difficult question of whether websites
are subject to regulation under the ADA for over twenty years, resulting
in two circuit splits and three approaches to website accessibility claims
under Title III. The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have taken an
unrestricted approach to website accessibility: allowing claims against
web-only businesses to proceed under Title III.200 The Sixth and Ninth
Circuit have taken a moderate approach: limiting Title III’s application
to brick-and-mortar businesses but allowing website accessibility claims
to proceed if the plaintiff can demonstrate a nexus between the website
and the physical businesses.201 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit has taken a
restrictive approach to website accessibility claims: limiting Title III’s
application to brick-and-mortar businesses but allowing website
accessibility claims to proceed if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
website creates an intangible barrier to accessing the goods and
services of the physical store.202 Each of these approaches has resulted
in vastly different case outcomes despite factually similar
circumstances.
Inconsistent application of Title III’s anti-discrimination provisions
has created confusion among lower courts and private businesses trying
to cobble together a consistent standard from the morass of diverging
opinions.203 Like cases should be treated alike,204 but as the comparison
of the decisions in Gil and Robles illustrates, the application of Title III
to similar factual circumstances does not result in the same outcome.205
The lack of uniformity in Title III caselaw is problematic for two
reasons: (1) the lack of coherent and consistent standards burdens
businesses because they are uncertain of their legal obligations, and (2)
the piecemeal litigation approach only addresses website accessibility
issues among a subset of disabled individuals.206
The lack of clear standards governing website accessibility claims
burdens businesses as they attempt to discern the appropriate

200. See supra Part VI, Section A.
201. See supra Part VI, Section B.1.
202. See supra Part VI, Section B.2.
203. Deeva V. Shah, Web Accessibility for Impaired Users: Applying Physical Solutions
to Digital Problems, 38 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215, 227 (2016).
204. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 196–199.
206. See Wolk, supra note 19, at 472–477; Meyer, supra note 77, at 29; Patrick
Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job: Are Commercial Websites Places of Public
Accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 191, 202 (2000).
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standards for compliance and prevents them from actively addressing
website accessibility issues.207 Like the accessibility of physical
facilities, website accessibility differs depending on the disability.208
Accessibility is not a one-size-fits-all approach and as technology
changes, so will accessibility standards. As the Supreme Court recently
stated, “[t]he forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so
protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what
they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”209 Take the Robles case as
an example. Domino’s argued that imposing WCAG 2.0 as the standard
for assessing liability under Title III violated its due process rights
because the Department had not formally adopted the standards.210
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that requiring
Domino’s to comply with WCAG 2.0 as a potential remedy for a
violation of Title III did not violate due process, time and money were
wasted litigating the issue.211 Furthermore, while compliance with
WCAG 2.0 would improve the accessibility of the defendant’s website,
the standards are not static. In fact, W3C updated its standards in 2018
(i.e., WCAG 2.1) and has plans to publish another version in 2022 (i.e.,
WCAG 2.2).212 Any court order or settlement agreement enforcing
WCAG 2.0 would thus leave out the updated accessibility requirements
included in WCAG 2.1 and 2.2. As a result, Domino’s website and
mobile application would once again be inaccessible despite prior
enforcement actions challenging accessibility.213 Relying on courts or
settlement agreements to set accessibility standards on a case-by-case
approach does not give defendants adequate notice of their legal

207. Wolk, supra note 19, at 473–74.
208. While individuals with vision- and upper-mobility-impairments may require
programming that ensures the website content is compatible with screen reader
technology, individuals who are deaf and hard of hearing may require closed captioning
for videos and other audio content. Meyer, supra note 77, at 23–25.
209. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (Kennedy, J.).
210. Robles, 913 F.3d at 907.
211. Id. at 909.
212. W3C, supra note 22.
213. For example, WCAG 2.0 does not address accessibility for individuals with
cognitive impairments. W3C, Making Content Usable for People with Cognitive and
Learning Disabilities (Apr. 2021), https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/NOTE-coga-usable20210429/. Consequently, compliance with WCAG 2.0 does not guarantee equal access to
online content for a large portion of the disabled population. As accessibility issues arise
and technology changes, accessibility standards must be updated.

2022

CLICKS, BRICKS, AND POLITICS

719

obligations or provide the flexibility necessary to ensure website
accessibility evolves with changing technology.214
The absence of clear rules also means that businesses are reacting to
website accessibility challenges rather than actively seeking to comply
with the statute’s anti-discrimination requirements. Attempting to
retrofit websites with accessibility features after the software and
programing framework is already established is much like retrofitting
buildings with ramps and guardrails after the foundation is laid and
the walls are in place—expensive and time-consuming.215 Furthermore,
launching an inaccessible product and then later altering it to comply
with accessibility requirements “is still a glaring form of inequality
since people with disabilities are excluded during the time gap between
inaccessibility and accessibility.”216 Requiring businesses to design their
websites with assistive technologies in mind up front, rather than after
the fact, would be more cost effective and ensure equal access to all
relevant website features.217 Nevertheless, the current legal landscape
surrounding website accessibility leaves businesses uncertain on their
obligations under the law and unable to proactively take steps to ensure
equal access to online forums without incurring significant costs.
The lack of clear standards governing website accessibility claims
inhibits the consistent and comprehensive protection of rights across
disabilities and jurisdictions.218 The current patchwork approach to
securing rights through litigation has resulted in some improvements to
website accessibility.219 But this progress is not enjoyed by all disabled
214. See Blue Apron, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185112, at *25 (“Uniform regulation in
this area would, of course, be preferable to the case-by-case approach required by its
absence.”).
215. Brian Wentz et al., Retrofitting Accessibility: The Legal Inequality of
After-the-Fact Online Access for Persons with Disabilities in the United States, FIRST
MONDAY (Nov. 7, 2011), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/3666/3077.
216. Id.
217. Id. Wentz explains that retrofitting online websites with accessibility features
after the fact increases cost and often fails to address all accessibility issues:
To illustrate the challenges and potential costs that retrofitting for accessibility
can produce, retrofitting a simple Tic-Tac-Toe computer game for accessibility
resulted in the lines of code growing from 192 to 1,412. This type of retrofit
would tend to be time-consuming and costly, compared to a project started with
universal access in mind. . . . If the application were designed with accessibility
in mind, the design could have more easily addressed this with fewer
statements of code.
Id.
218. Wolk, supra note 19, at 474.
219. See, e.g., Markett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115212, at *6 (requiring that Five Guys
make its website accessible).
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individuals.220 Disabled individuals in New York enjoy much broader
protection of rights than disabled individuals in Georgia.221 Allowing
circuits to apply the protections of Title III differently in similar
circumstances runs afoul of the purpose of the ADA to provide national,
consistent, and clear standards for accessibility.222 Additionally, relying
on litigation to enforce website accessibility standards gives substantial
discretion to the Department to enforce its interpretation of the ADA,
which further adds to the inconsistency. For example, the Department
previously took the position that Title III applies to web-only
businesses.223 However, the Department has altered its position,
concluding that Title III applies only to websites associated with
brick-and-mortar businesses.224 Thus, while the Department currently
endorses the view that Title III applies to websites—but notably not all
websites—there is nothing preventing the Department from further
changing its position. The rights of disabled individuals should not
fluctuate with changes in administrations. In the absence of clear
statutory language requiring the Attorney General to guarantee equal
access to websites and other online platforms, the Department can
evade its prosecutorial duty by simply declaring that Title III does not
apply to intangible spaces.225
Lastly, litigation has focused on remedying accessibility issues faced
by a subset of the disabled population. The majority of website
accessibility claims have focused on accessibility issues related to vision
and hearing impairments, ignoring the rights of other disabled
individuals.226 For example, in Netflix, the plaintiffs alleged that
Netflix’s “watch instantly” page was inaccessible because it lacked
closed captioning.227 Following the district court’s decision applying
Title III’s anti-discrimination provisions to web-only businesses, such as

220. See, e.g., Gil, 993 F.3d at 1270 (denying plaintiffs request that Winn-Dixie alter
its website to provide accessible content).
221. Compare Andrews, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 398, with Gil, 993 F.3d at 1270.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
223. Statement of Interest of the United States of America in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc.,
No.
3:11-cv-30168,
at
*6
(D.
Mass.
May
15,
2012),
https://www.ada.gov/briefs/netflix_SOI.pdf.
224. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc.,
No.
16-CV-23020-RN,
at
*5
(S.D.
Fla.
Dec.
12,
2016),
https://www.ada.gov/briefs/winn_dixie_soi.pdf.
225. Wolk, supra note 19, at 473.
226. See Brunner, supra note 19, at 190 n.170; Wolk, supra note 19, at 475–76.
227. 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
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streaming services, Netflix entered into a settlement agreement.228 The
agreement required Netflix to update its website to provide closed
captioning and train its employees on issues related to closed
captioning, but made no mention of education or website alterations for
other accessibility issues.229 Furthermore, the agreement is limited to
the specific business subject to the enforcement action. Although the
settlement agreement with Netflix was a step in the right direction, it
did not remedy accessibility issues faced by individuals with other types
of disabilities or ensure equal access to content on other streaming
services.
The ADA was designed to guarantee individuals with disabilities
equal access to a host of private and public activities, services, and
facilities.230 But the current approach to website accessibility only
targets a subset of websites and addresses accessibility issues among a
subset of disabilities.231 This piecemeal litigation landscape, which has
resulted in divergent approaches to evaluating website accessibility
across circuits, is not adequately protecting the rights of disabled
Americans. Scholars and jurists recognize that website accessibility
caselaw is a mess and a host of different solutions have been proposed
to remedy the pervasive problems in the current approaches to website
accessibility claims.232 Overall these proposed solutions fall into three
general categories: adopting a broad interpretation of statutory text,
promulgating regulations, or amending the text of the ADA.
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Scholars have proposed three remedies to the problem of website
inaccessibility. First, some scholars argue that courts should adopt an

228. Consent Decree, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-30168-MAP, at
§ 3(b) (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2012).
229. Id. For example, cognitive disabilities have been largely left out of website
accessibility claims. W3C is in the process of updating its standards to include
accessibility criteria targeted at addressing cognitive disabilities, illustrating the need to
provide accessible technologies for these individuals. Supra note 208.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 207–229.
232. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 115, at 1004 (arguing that circuits should all adopt
the nexus approach); Meyer, supra note 77, at 29 (arguing that the text of the ADA should
be amended); Claeyssen, supra note 6, at 1542–44 (arguing that courts should interpret
Title III to regulate web-only businesses); Nikki D. Kessling, Why the Target “Nexus Test”
Leaves Disabled Americans Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether
Private Commercial Websites Are “Places of Public Accommodation,” 45 HOUS. L. REV.
991, 1024 (2008) (arguing for a “commerce and character” based approach to evaluating
websites under the ADA).
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expansive interpretation of the current text of the ADA to incorporate
all websites within the purview of its anti-discrimination provisions.233
Second, other scholars argue that that the Department should issue
regulatory guidance that clarifies the ADA’s application to websites and
sets out comprehensive standards to determine whether a website is
accessible.234 Third, additional scholars argue that the text of the ADA
should be amended to incorporate provisions specifically regulating
websites.235 The best method to achieve the original goals of the ADA,
within the context of the current technological era, is a hybrid
approach, where Congress amends the text of the statute to clarify its
application to websites and requires the Department to promulgate
regulations on website accessibility within a specific timeframe.
A. Judicial Intervention
For years, advocates have attempted to persuade courts that Title III
regulates websites, resulting in two circuit splits and divergent opinions
on how the ADA applies to websites. Continuing down this path will
only lead to further confusion for two reasons. First, the only way to
resolve the two circuit splits through the judicial branch is for the
Supreme Court to take up a case and declare a universal interpretation
of the text. Even though the issue has been percolating in the lower
courts for over twenty years, the Supreme Court has refused to step
into the fray. And the Supreme Court’s decision to deny cert in the
Robles case further illustrates that the Court is in no rush to resolve the
debate on the applicability of Title III to website accessibility claims.236
Waiting for the Supreme Court to step in and provide clarity on this
issue is, as Hillary Duff once said, “like waiting for rain in this drought.
Useless and disappointing.”237 As the Court continues to weigh the pros
and cons of stepping into the chaos of website accessibility, online
content remains inaccessible, and businesses are no closer to
understanding their obligations under the law.
Second, even if the Supreme Court did establish a universal
interpretation of the text, it would not remedy the problem of
insufficient standards defining accessibility. The confusion surrounding

233. See, e.g., Shani Else, Courts Must Welcome the Reality of the Modern World:
Cyberspace Is A Place Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1121, 1155 (2008).
234. See, e.g., Albani, supra note 4, at 111.
235. See, e.g., Wolk, supra note 19, at 472.
236. Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Robles, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (denying Domino’s petition
for writ of certiorari).
237. A Cinderella Story (Warner Bros. Pictures 2004).
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the standards applicable to website accessibility claims under Title II
illustrates that the solution to the circuit split in Title III claims is not
further judicial interpretation. Although the issue is relatively new,
courts are in agreement that Title II includes websites within its
mandate.238 Nevertheless, confusion abounds on the specific standards
and guidelines public entities must follow to comply with Title II’s
accessibility requirements.239 In the absence of clear legal definitions on
accessibility in the digital context, courts consistently require that
claims proceed to trial in order to resolve disputes as to the exact
meaning of accessibility.240 Judicial confusion on the standards to
adjudicate website accessibility claims under Title II illustrates that
even if courts were to agree that Title III applies to websites that would
not resolve the underlying problem—the lack of clear standards
applicable to websites. Creating standards to determine whether a
website has complied with Title III’s accessibility requirements is a job
for the legislative or executive branch. Like the physical accessibility
standards outlined in the statute, Congress needs to clarify the
application of the ADA to websites and delegate authority to the
Department to set specific accessibility standards applicable to websites
and emerging technologies.
B. Promulgating Regulations or Amending the Text of the Statute
Some scholars assert that promulgating regulations or amending the
text of the statute could remedy the current chaos of website
accessibility caselaw. However, while regulations or an amendment to
the text would improve website accessibility, each avenue alone is
insufficient to remedy the entire problem. Relying only on the
Department’s regulatory authority would not guarantee the application
of the ADA to web-only businesses and only amending the text of the
statute would not allow for the flexibility necessary to set accessibility
standards that evolve with emerging technologies.
The current circuit split over the application of Title III to intangible
spaces means that Department regulations related to web-only
businesses could be ignored as contrary to the plain meaning of the
text. The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. National Resource
Defense Council,241 held that regulations promulgated under statutory
authority are afforded increased deference.242 However, courts are not
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra note 52.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 844.
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required to defer to the agency interpretation if such an interpretation
is “manifestly contrary” to the plain meaning of the statute.243 Congress
delegated authority to the Department to promulgate regulations; thus
these regulations are given heightened deference.244 Nevertheless,
courts have already interpreted the plain meaning of Title III to exclude
web-only businesses.245 This conclusion could be used by courts to
ignore Department regulations requiring web-only businesses to comply
with accessibility standards, as manifestly contrary to the plain
meaning of the text of Title III.246
The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded
that Title III only applies to physical, tangible spaces based on the plain
meaning of the text.247 For example, in Gil, the Eleventh Circuit
explicitly stated that the text was “unambiguous and clear,” that Title
III applied only to tangible spaces and not websites alone, excluding
web-only businesses from the ADA’s obligations.248 Regulations
requiring web-only businesses to conform to Title III’s accessibility
requirements would conflict with these circuits’ interpretation of the
plain, unambiguous meaning of the text. Applying Title III’s
anti-discrimination requirements to web-only businesses is necessary to
ensure disabled individuals can meaningfully participate in online
spaces. However, the current circuit split over the application of Title
III to intangible spaces means that Department regulations could be
invalidated as contrary to the plain meaning of the text.249 Regulations
on their own are thus insufficient to ensure the accessibility of all
websites, regardless of the website’s connection to a physical space.

243. Id.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2008).
245. E.g., Gil, 993 F.3d at 1276.
246. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker, 121 F.3d
at 1012 n.5.
247. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 n.3; Ford, 145 F.3d at 613; Gil,
993 F.3d at 1277.
248. Gil, 993 F.3d at 1277.
249. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, held that if a court
concludes a statute is “unambiguous” then the court’s interpretation “trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference.” 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). In
circuits where the court has held that the statute is clear, the agency regulation adopting
a contrary approach would not even be entitled to Chevron deference. Id. Thus, in the
Eleventh Circuit, where the court has unequivocally held that Title III does not apply to
web-only businesses based on the “unambiguous” interpretation of the statute, contrary
regulations from the Department would not be analyzed under Chevron. Gil, 993 F.3d at
1277.
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Similarly, amending the text of the statute would clarify the
application of Title III to websites but would not solve the problem of
specific standards on website accessibility. As demonstrated by the Title
II caselaw, courts need clear, consistent guidelines to analyze whether
an entity’s website is accessible under the ADA.250 While Congress
could adopt specific accessibility standards, such as the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), delegating rulemaking authority to
the Department on the issue of website accessibility would be preferable
for two reasons.
First, the Department possesses the specialized knowledge and
expertise to create the appropriate standards on website accessibility.
Working to make digital spaces accessible requires expert knowledge
and skill. Getting Congress up to speed on the particulars of website
accessibility would be a time-consuming and repetitive process when
the attorneys at the Department already possess the requisite
knowledge to promulgate appropriate standards.
Second, regulations set by the Department would provide greater
flexibility as technology changes. Websites and other digital spaces are
constantly changing. W3C has updated its accessibility standards three
times within the last thirteen years, illustrating the rapidly changing
environment of digital accessibility.251 The notice and rulemaking
process was designed to be flexible and enable executive agencies to
adjust regulations and guidance as technology changes. While Congress
could codify specific standards, the legislative process is cumbersome
and difficult. As technology changes and the standards become
outdated, disabled individuals would suffer as new content becomes
once again inaccessible. While Congress cannot easily respond to quick
technological developments, the regulation process is poised to adapt to
changing circumstances. Thus, delegating authority to the Department
to promulgate regulations as new technologies emerge would ensure
that disabled individuals are never relegated to second-class digital
citizens.
C. Hybrid Approach: Amending the Text of the Statute and
Promulgating Regulations
The best method to bridge the digital divide is a hybrid approach
combining textual amendments and delegating rulemaking authority.
Congress should amend the text of the ADA to clarify its application to
digital spaces, such as websites, mobile applications, and other online

250. See supra text accompanying notes 58–66.
251. W3C, supra note 22.
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platforms. By unambiguously including digital spaces within the
definition of place of public accommodation, courts and the Department
would not have the leeway to ignore the application of the ADA to
websites and other emerging technologies. Additionally, Congress
should require that the Department promulgate regulations laying out
specific accessibility standards for digital spaces within a specific
timeframe. The creation of comprehensive standards for evaluating
website accessibility would ensure that businesses understand their
obligations under the law and disabled Americans have equal access to
the Internet.
IX. CONCLUSION
The importance of the Internet in the daily lives of Americans cannot
be overstated. However, a large portion of the population remains cut
off from the important resources that private businesses and public
entities offer online. Disability advocates have sought to use the current
text of the ADA to remedy the problem of website inaccessibility
through the federal court system. While this approach has increased
the accessibility of many websites, it is insufficient. Judicial confusion
on the application of the ADA to intangible spaces and the appropriate
standards to apply to evaluate accessibility illustrate that continued
judicial interpretation of the current ADA text will not provide the
clear, cohesive, and comprehensive standards necessary to remedy the
widespread problem of website inaccessibility. Rather the best solution
to is to amend the text of the statute to clarify its application to digital
spaces and promulgate regulations outlining specific accessibility
standards. This approach would ensure that disabled individuals can
fully enjoy the privileges and advantages of an increasingly digitalized
society.

